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In the past decade the Colombian Economic Authorities undertook a series of measures that 
reduced  the  structural  fiscal  deficit,  decreased  the  Government  currency  mismatch  and 
deepened  the  local  fixed-rate  public  bond  market.  This  paper  presents  some  evidence 
suggesting  that  these  improvements  had  important  effects  on  the  behavior  of  the 
macroeconomy.  They  seem  to  have  permanently  reduced  the  sovereign  risk  premium, 
increased the reaction of output to Government expenditure shocks and strengthened the 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade the Colombian Government and Congress undertook a series of 
measures  and  reforms  that  significantly  shifted  the  trend  of  public  debt,  reduced  the 
financial fragility of the Government and deepened the domestic public bond market. First, 
starting  from  a  rising,  unsustainable  debt  path,  several  structural  fiscal  reforms  were 
instrumental in the decline of the public debt-GDP ratio between 2003 and 2008, and its 
more recent stability. Second, an explicit policy of diminishing the currency mismatch of 
the  public  finances  decreased  their  vulnerability  in  the  face  of  a  sharp  depreciation 
following an adverse external shock. Third, there has been an effort to shift the composition 
of public debt toward fixed-rate, peso-denominated bonds and to lengthen its maturity. 
One would expect that this set of prudent policies had important effects on the behavior 
of the macroeconomy both in the long term and in response to exogenous shocks. After 
briefly highlighting some aspects of fiscal policy and public debt management in the past 
ten years, this paper assesses some of those effects. Specifically, the influence of fiscal 
policy changes on the country´s sovereign risk premium, the short-run response of output to 
a fiscal shock and the transmission of monetary policy shocks to market interest rates are 
evaluated. 
 
2.  Fiscal Policy in Colombia  
The adoption of a new Constitution in 1991 implied a strong expansion of the size of 
Government in Colombia. Increased demand for public spending in health, education and 
justice  drove  Central  Government  primary  expenditure  from  7.2%  of  GDP  in  1990  to 
12.4% of GDP in 2000. At the same time, the Constitution of 1991 and the Law extended 
fiscal decentralization and imposed a regime in which an increasing fraction of Central 
Government  current  revenues  was  transferred  to  local  governments.  The  tax  increases 
adopted to pay for the additional expenditure were not sufficient and had to be shared with 
local governments, which, in turn, increased their spending. In addition, the intertemporal 
solvency of the pay-as-you-go national pension system was in doubt, given its prevailing 
parameters and the co-existence of a defined-contribution private pension fund system. 
By  the  end  of  the  nineties  fiscal  sustainability  in  Colombia  was  uncertain.  Central 
Government debt to GDP ratio was rising fast and several local governments were over-
indebted. The external shocks of that period (especially the Russian crisis) triggered the 
largest output drop in Colombia since the Great Depression and a financial crisis. The cost 
of the latter had to be absorbed by the Government, thus worsening an already weak fiscal 
situation.  
Starting in the early 2000s an adjustment had to be implemented that included four tax 
reforms, two reforms to the transfers to sub-national governments and other measures that 
substantially reduced the Non Financial Public Sector (NFPS) deficit from 4.9% of the 
GDP in 1999 to a balanced position in 2008. During this period, the deficit of the central 
government was reduced from 6% to 2.3% of the GDP while the remaining NFPS recorded 
surplus  balances.  As  a  result,  the  Central  Government  debt  to  GDP  ratio  declined   3 
throughout the 2000s and has been stable in recent years (Graph 1). Moreover, a reform to 
the general pension regime in 2003 made progress toward ensuring the sustainability of the 
pay-as-you-go system. 
Since 2003, Colombia has been implementing its fiscal policy through a qualitative 
rule: Law 819 on transparency and fiscal responsibility. Under this mandate, the Central 
Government must prepare every year a Medium Term Fiscal Framework as its main tool 
for financial programming (Marco Fiscal de Mediano Plazo, MFMP for its acronym in 
Spanish). The MFMP sets a numerical target for the primary balance of the NFPS for the 
following year as well as some indicative targets for the subsequent ten years, so that public 
indebtedness remains in line with a sustainable path. Among other aspects, the MFMP 
includes an assessment of the contingent liabilities of the public sector, the cost of tax 
benefits, and some sections on the fiscal programming of sub-national governments. Fiscal 
forecasts  are  made  based  on  macroeconomic  assumptions  jointly  formulated  by  the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Central Bank (CB), and the National Planning Department 
(NPD). 
Even though the MFMP is a valuable tool for fiscal stance programming, it has some 
constraints from a macroeconomic perspective. On the one hand, the multi-annual primary 
balance  targets  are  adjusted  repeatedly  for  diverse  reasons,  thus  lessening  the  initial 
commitments of the Government. On the other hand, it does not assess explicitly the effects 
of  the  business  cycle  on  tax  revenues  and  expenditures,  which  increases  the  risk  of 
procyclicality in fiscal policy.  In fact, some studies have found some evidence of pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy in Colombia and other emerging economies (Cárdenas et al., 
2006, Lozano, 2011 and Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008).     
To overcome the MFMP limitations, Law 1473, by which the Central Government 
adopted a quantitative fiscal rule, was passed by mid-2011. In addition to ensuring the 
sustainability  of  public  debt  and  promoting  a  countercyclical  fiscal  policy  stance,  it  is 
expected  to  alleviate  the  effects  of  exchange  rate  volatility  on  the  economy’s  tradable 
activities, for it would foster a better management of the resources generated by the mining 
and  energy  sectors.  Furthermore,  the  framework  of  fiscal  policy  in  Colombia  was 
supplemented with a royalty-law for the exploitation of natural resources approved in 2011. 
This law aims at distributing royalty funds more equitably among the country’s several 
regions and at saving their transitory component. 
 
3.  Public Debt Management in Colombia 
Along  with  fiscal  consolidation,  in  the last  decade  the  Colombian  Authorities  have 
sought to improve the composition of public debt in order to reduce the financial fragility 
of Government and to encourage the development of capital markets in the country. To that 
end steps were taken to decrease the currency mismatch of the public sector, by shifting the 
composition  of  its  debt  from  foreign  currency  denominated  bonds  and  loans  (mostly 
external debt) toward local currency denominated bonds (mostly internally issued). As a   4 
result, a substantial drop in a currency mismatch indicator was achieved for the Central 
Government (Graph 2)
1. 
In turn, an effort has been made to change the composition of domestic debt from 
inflation or dollar indexed bonds toward fixed-rate peso denominated bonds (Graph 3). 
This process began in the late nineties with the inception of a market makers program, but 
was greatly enhanced by fiscal consolidation, the achievement of single digit inflation and a 
consistent  convergence  toward  the  long  term  inflation  target  (3%)  in  the  2000s.  In 
September  2011  the  stock  of  local,  fixed-interest,  peso  denominated  bonds  (TES) 
accounted for 51.4% of total Central Government debt and represented 18.3% of GDP.  
Besides  increasing  the  participation  of  these  instruments  in  total  debt,  Government 
policy has successfully extended the maturity of the new issues throughout the last decade 
(Graph 4), a sign of credibility in both fiscal and monetary policy (Hamann and González, 
2011). The share of the outstanding stock of bonds with less than one year residual maturity 
has declined in the past ten years in favor of issues with maturity greater than five years, 
while the share of issues with residual maturity between three and five years has remained 
stable  (Graph  5).  Today  the  longest  maturity  in  the  TES  market  is  fifteen  years.  This 
attainment has been important for the development of a fixed rate mortgage loan market in 
the  2000s  (Galindo  and  Hoffstetter,  2008,  and  Hamann  et  al.,  2010),  and  may  have 
influenced the transmission of monetary policy shocks to other financial system interest 
rates, as will be discussed below. 
 
4.  The Macroeconomic Effects of the Fiscal Policy Changes 
The aforementioned improvements in fiscal and public debt management policy were 
large enough to have an impact on the behavior of the macroeconomy both in the long term 
and in response to exogenous shocks. This section explores some of those effects. 
 
a.  Effects on the sovereign risk premium  
Among the most important goals of the structural adjustment process undertaken since 
the early 2000s were ensuring the sustainability of the public debt and strengthening the 
resilience of the economy in the face of external shocks. Specifically, the correction of 
structural imbalances and the shift in the trend of the public debt to GDP ratio must have 
reduced the probability of default of the Colombian Government and the vulnerability of 
the  latter  to  shocks  hitting  its  revenues  and  expenses.  Further,  the  fall  of  its  currency 
                                                           
1  The indicator, inspired by Goldstein and Turner (2004) and Rojas-Suárez and Montoro (2011), attempts to 
capture the ability of the Central Government to serve its foreign currency-linked debt on the basis of its 
foreign  currency-linked  revenues.  It  is  constructed  as  the  ratio:  (FCD/TD)  /  (FCR/TR)  for  the  Central 
Government. FCD = Foreign Currency Debt. TD = Total Debt. FCR = Foreign-currency-linked revenue, 
which includes external VAT, import tariffs, Ecopetrol (the state oil company) dividends, income  taxes paid 
by  mining  companies  and  other  exporting  firms,  and  income  derived  from  external  assets.  TR  =  Total 
revenue.  Data  sources:  Banco  de  la  República,  DANE,  DIAN,  Ecopetrol,  Supersociedades  and  Hamann, 
Lozano and Mejía (2011).   5 
mismatch must have reinforced the ability of the Government to withstand a depreciation 
shock. At a more aggregate level, the decline in the Government currency mismatch was 
part of a general trend that also included the private sector and allowed a greater scope for 
exchange rate flexibility and the possibility of a countercyclical monetary policy response 
to external shocks. This, in turn, moderated the effect those shocks on output and fiscal 
revenues. 
Overall, the reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio and Government currency 
mismatch must have decreased the credit risk of the Government and the country. Hence, 
they must have contributed to a permanent drop in the sovereign risk premium and to a 
decline in its sensitivity to global risk aversion shocks.  
To test the first implication, we estimated a model for the Colombian sovereign risk 
premium, measured by the EMBI Colombia, based on the following specification: 
embict = grat + d/y)t + cmt + t  
embic is the EMBI Colombia, gra is a measure of global risk aversion, d/y is the Central 
Government debt to GDP ratio and cm is the currency mismatch indicator calculated above. 
As measures of global risk aversion, the VIX and the 5-year high yield spread were used. 
All  variables  were  expressed  in  logs  and  were  non-stationary  in  the  sample  1999.Q2-
2011.Q4 (quarterly data). Cointegration was found for these systems based on the Hansen 
test (Hansen, 1992).  
The long run relationships presented in Table 1 confirm the importance of local 
fiscal variables in the determination of the Embi Colombia, beyond the effect of global risk 
aversion. In both specifications (with the VIX and the high yield spread as measures of 
global risk aversion) the Government currency mismatch appears significant and with the 
expected positive sign. The debt to GDP ratio is also significant and with the expected 
positive sign in the specification that uses the VIX as the global risk aversion variable 
(Table 1, upper panel). It is positive, but not significant in the specification that includes the 
high yield spread as the measure of global risk aversion (Table 1, lower panel). 
The  second  implication,  changing  sensitivity  of  the  sovereign  risk  premium  to 
global risk aversion as a result of improved fiscal policy, is tested by Julio et al (2012). 
Following  Favero  and  Giavazzi  (2004),  these  authors  estimate  a  model  in  which  the 
response of the Embi Colombia to the spread between the US BAA corporate bonds and the 
10-year US Treasury Bonds depends on the difference between the observed Government 
primary surplus and the value of the primary surplus that would stabilize the debt to GDP 
ratio at each point in time. They posit a non-linear relationship in which large observed 
primary surpluses relative to their debt ratio-stabilizing values drive the sensitivity of the 
Embi Colombia to global risk aversion toward zero, while the opposite situation increases 
that sensitivity.  
Working on a monthly sample between 1998 and 2010, Julio et al. (2012) find that 
the sensitivity of the Embi Colombia to their measure of global risk aversion does depend 
significantly on their fiscal health indicator. Furthermore, they find a structural break in the   6 
sensitivity function around mid-2006. After this period, there seems to be a substantial 
reduction  of  the  sensitivity  function,  which  the  authors  associate  both  to  a  permanent 
improvement in the Colombian fiscal health indicators and to the deterioration of public 
debt ratios in advanced economies.           
In sum, the evidence presented in this section and in Julio et al. (2012) supports the 
hypothesis that the aforesaid improvements in fiscal policy and public debt management 
did  reduce  permanently  the  sovereign  risk  premium  in  Colombia  and  its  sensitivity  to 
global risk aversion shocks. The macroeconomic implications of this result are important. 
 First, it means that, ceteris paribus, the long term level of the real interest rate must 
be lower today than a decade ago
2. Based on the long run relationship presented in Table 1 
(upper  panel),  on  average,  local  factors  (the  decline  in  the  Government  currency 
mismatches and the debt to GDP ratio) would imply roughly a 60% decrease in the Embi 
Colombia between 2002.Q1-2006.Q4 and 2007.Q1-2011.Q4
3.  
Also, a permanent decrease in the risk premium entails a permanent adjustment in 
the long run level of the real exchange rate. Hence, it could be argued that part of the real 
appreciation of the COP in the past decade could be attributed to better fiscal policy. The 
permanent movement of the long run level of both the real interest rate and the real 
exchange rate has important consequences for the design and operation of monetary policy. 
It implies that the mean value of the natural interest rate must be lower than ten years ago 
and that indicators of trend real exchange rates that give large weights to values from the 
early 2000s are probably biased. 
Second, the empirical results suggest that the economy is generally less vulnerable 
to global risk aversion shocks because of the reduced sensitivity of the risk premium to 
them. This implies lower responses of the exchange rate and capital flows to those shocks, 
and, consequently, lower pressure on inflation, output and monetary policy. 
b.  Effects on the short-run response of output to Government expenditure shocks 
It is likely that the perception of households, firms and investors about the sustainability 
of the public debt and the financial fragility of the Government influences their reaction to 
fiscal  policy  shocks.  An  unexpected  increase  in  public  expenditure  may  prompt  an 
expectation of higher taxes in the short run in a dire financial situation of the Government, 
thereby offsetting its possibly expansionary effect on output. Moreover, a similar shock in a 
small,  open  economy  may  sharply  raise  the  sovereign  risk  premium,  bringing  about  a 
tightening response of the monetary authority to curb currency depreciation and inflation, 
or a contraction of external finance and credit (Ilzetzki et al., 2009). When public debt 
sustainability is more certain or Government currency or liquidity mismatches are low, the 
expansionary effects of a public expenditure shock may be greater. 
                                                           
2 Interestingly, the external real interest rate decreased in the same period, reinforcing the effect of a lower 
sovereign risk premium on domestic real interest rates. 
3 We computed the changes in the logarithm of the average Government currency mismatch indicator and the 
debt  to  GDP  ratio  between  2002.Q1-2006.Q4  and  2007.Q1 -2011.Q4,  and  multiplied  them  by  the 
corresponding elasticities from Table 1. We then added the calculated impacts.   7 
  To  explore  this  hypothesis  the  empirical  strategy  must  carefully  consider  the 
problems of identification of a fiscal shock (finding the movement of fiscal variables that 
are not contemporaneous responses to output) and the anticipation of fiscal policy by the 
private sector. The first issue is crucial to avoid a bias in the estimation of the response of 
output to an exogenous fiscal shock and requires isolating the part of the movement in the 
fiscal variables that are purely discretionary, non-output related changes. The second issue 
is important because an anticipated fiscal policy shift may induce an anticipated response 
by  the  private  sector  consumption  or  output,  so  that  the  estimated  response  after  the 
realization of the shift could be biased (Perotti, 2007). 
SVAR models have been widely used in the literature to identify fiscal shocks
4. 
Another technique, the so called “narrative approach”, uses dummy variables to measure 
the effects of fiscal policy shocks that are not related to movements of output (e.g. wars, 
“ideological” policy shifts, output-independent cross sectional effects etc.)
5. In Colombia 
SVAR models used to estimate the effect of fiscal policy shocks on output have rendered 
results  that  range  from  negligible  impacts  (Restrepo  and  Rincón,  2 006)  to  positive 
expenditure multipliers between 1.1 and 1.2 (Lozano and Rodríguez, 2011). However, these 
studies include a relatively long sub-period in which the exchange rate was not as flexible 
as after 1999 (crawling peg or target zone regimes). Consequently, their estimated impacts 
may be affected by a structural break related to the adoption of a floating exchange rate 
regime
6. 
Our approach differs from the previous work in three important dimensions. First, 
our sample covers only the floating exchan ge rate period (1999-2011). Second, we are 
interested in capturing a possibly changing effect of public expenditure shocks, as fiscal 
policy became sounder throughout the 2000s. This implies the use of a non-linear technique 
that allows for a smooth transition between regimes that are defined according to indicators 
of fiscal health. Third, since we do not estimate a SVAR, we identify the Government 
expenditure shock based on innovations on the publicly known spending announces for the 
Central Government
7. 
Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), instead of estimating a SVAR and 
deriving standard impulse response functions, we approximate the non -linear impulse-
response function by the following linear projection: 
Yt+h = G(zt) (
hFt + L) Yt-1) + (1-G(zt)) (
hFt + L) Yt-1) + t
                                                           
4 See for example Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for the U.S.; Perotti, (2004), and Caldara and Kamps (2008) 
for the OECD countries. 
5  See Perotti (2007) and Romer (2011). 
6 Standard Mundell-Fleming theory suggests that the exchange rate regime makes a difference regarding the 
effect of fiscal policy shocks in a small open economy. See Ilzetzki et al. (2009) for some evidence about the 
differences of output responses to fiscal shocks in economies with flexible and pegged exchange rates. 
7 We do not study the effects of tax shocks due to the difficulties involved in their identification and the 
problems  derived  from  the  sensitivity  of  the  theoretical  results  to  the  time  profile  of  distortionary  tax 
responses (Perotti, 2007).   8 
The  impulse  response  function  of  output  (Yt+h)  to  an  unexpected  government 
expenditure  shock  (Ft)  is  estimated  directly  by  G(zt)  
h
  +  (1-G(zt))  
h





are estimated by least squares(see for details Jordà, 2005).  
Notice that the impulse response function depends on the value of the variable zt. In 
our case,  zt is  a fiscal  health indicator. At a  given point in  time the impulse response 
function may be understood as combination or "average" of the functions corresponding to 
the extreme states of the fiscal health indicators (e.g. "High Debt" vs. "Low Debt", or "High 
Currency Mismatch" vs. "Low Currency Mismatch"). The weight of each extreme state will 
be given by the transition function G(zt) = e
-zt/(1+e
-zt), which measures how close the 
fiscal health indicator of the moment is to one extreme state or to the other. 
The above technique requires the definition of an exogenous Government spending 
shock,  Ft  ,  outside  the  model  that  meets  the  criteria  of  no  anticipation  and  no 
contemporaneous correlation with output. To do so, we define the shock as the difference 
between the Central Government actual primary expenditures (overall spending without 
interest payments on public debt) and the forecast made of this variable
8. For the OECD 
countries, these predictions are typically taken from professional forecasting surveys. Since 
this type of information is not available for Colombia, we derived it from the Ministry of 
Finance announced Financial Plans as explained in the Appendix 1. The fiscal shocks so 
computed are not anticipated by construction, nor are they correlat ed with current output 
because of the lag with which output and other real activity data are available, and the lag 
with which expenditure decisions are executed
9.  
  As fiscal health variables, zt, we used the Central Government debt to GDP ratio, the 
Government  currency  mismatch  and  the  difference  between  the  observed  Government 
primary surplus and the value of the primary surplus that would stabilize the debt to GDP 
ratio at  each point in  time (Graph 6)
10. The impulse response functions of output to a 
Government  expenditure  shock  are  estimated  using  quarterly  data  for  the  1999 -2011 
sample.  
The results in Graphs 7 and 8  suggest that there were important changes in the 
response of output to the fiscal shock throughout the decade, as fiscal health indicators 
improved markedly
11. The responses in the beginning of the decade were,  when positive, 
small and short-lived; in  other cases, they were  negative on impact  and non-significant 
afterwards. When the debt to GDP ratio stopped rising or the primary surplus deviation 
                                                           
8 Due to data availability, we use Central Government primary expenditure, which corresponds roughly to two 
thirds of total General Government primary expenditure.  
9 A potential drawback of our measure of expenditure shock is that we cannot separate public  consumption, 
investment, transfers and subsidies expenses, since the Government Financial Plans do not disaggregate the 
outlays in these categories. We are then capturing the effects of a shock to aggregate Central Government 
expenditure. This may be a pro blem if the macroeconomic effects of public consumption , investment and 
transfers shocks are very different, and if the composition of the aggregate shocks changes significantly from 
year to year. 
10 See Julio et al. (2012) for details on the construction of this series. 
11 The technique used allows us to estimate the impulse response functions with confidence intervals for each 
quarter in the sample. The results presented in Graphs 8 to 10 correspond to the average responses for each 
year with the confidence interval calculated appropriately. We used four lags of the GDP in the estimation.    9 
from its debt-stabilizing level increased (2002-2003), output responses turned positive and 
remained significantly different from zero for several periods. Interestingly, the positive 
reactions seem to be clearer and larger when the primary surplus is higher (2007-2008) 
(Graph  8),  although  in  no  case  the  estimated  conditional  Government  expenditure 
multipliers exceed one. Similarly, the output responses related to low Government currency 
mismatches (2005-2011) were in general significantly positive for several quarters, unlike 
the responses observed in years of high currency mismatches (1999-2004) (Graph 9)
12. 
Hence, the power of fiscal (expenditure) policy to affect output is greate r, the 
stronger the financial position of the Government. The implication of this result for the 
assessment of the convenience of countercyclical fiscal policy is apparent. I.e., a sound 
public finance situation not only has benefits in terms of permanentl y lower real interest 
rates and lower vulnerability of the economy to global risk aversion shocks, but also seems 
to enhance the effectiveness of countercyclical fiscal policy.  
c.  Effects on the transmission of monetary policy shocks to market interest rates 
As the fiscal  situation improved structurally and monetary policy  gained credibility 
throughout de 2000s (Hamann and González, 2011), the transmission of monetary policy 
shifts to financial market interest rates may have been strengthened. To begin, under a more 
credible monetary policy regime, a movement in overnight policy rates is likelier to be 
incorporated in longer term public bonds and financial system interest rates because the 
policy change will most probably be perceived by market participants as a persistent signal 
on the policy stance, instead of a noisy policy error to be undone in the near future.  
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the enhanced credibility of a low and stable inflation 
rate as well as a stronger perception of public debt sustainability permitted the extension of 
the maturity of fixed-rate public bonds. Consequently, the depth and liquidity of longer 
term public bond markets may have been increased, thereby making their prices a better 
guide to interest rate setters in the financial system and allowing them to better filter the 
news from a monetary policy shock. 
          To explore the relevance of these hypotheses we use the same non-linear model of 
the foregoing section to test whether the transmission of monetary policy shocks to public 
bond  interest  rates  (TES)  and  deposit  or  loan  rates  changed  as  the  maturity  of  the 
Government fixed income market was expanded throughout the 2000s. Specifically, we 
estimate the following monthly models for TES and market interest rates: 
                                                           
12 When interpreting the impulse response functions presented in Graphs 8-10, it must be recalled that they 
are  conditional  on  the  state  of  the  fiscal  variable  used  to  define  the  regime.  For  example,  in  2004  the 
responses of output to the fiscal shock were generally positive when the fiscal variable regime is measured by 
the difference between the primary surplus and its debt-stabilizing level, but essentially zero when the fiscal 
variable regime is measured by the Government currency mismatch. This means that the response of output 
conditional on the surplus variable of that year was significantly positive, but the response conditional on the 
currency mismatch observed in the same year was non-significant. Overall, it may be concluded that the 
probability of a positive impact of a fiscal shock on output increased in 2004 with respect to previous years in 
which all conditional responses were non-significant, but is smaller than in later years, when all conditional 
responses were statistically positive.   10 
itest+h = H(zt) (1
h Mt +1(L) itest-1 +t ) + (1-H(zt)) (2
h Mt + 2(L) itest-1 t ) + t 
imt+h = J(zt) (1
h Mt + B1(L) imt-1+ K1(L) itest-1) + (1-J(zt)) (2
h Mt + B2(L) imt-1+ K2(L) itest-1) + t 
The  response  of  TES  rates,  itest+h,  to  an  unanticipated  monetary  shock,  Mt,  is 
approximated directly by H(zt) 1
h + (1-H(zt)) 2
h  in a linear projection estimated by least 
squares (Jordà, 2005)
13. Notice that this response is allowed to change as a function of the 
maturity of the new issues of fixed rate TES (zt = long term componenet of the average 
maturity of new issues) (Graph 4). A similar model is estimated for the response of market 
(deposit  or  loan)  interest  rates,  imt+h,  to  an  unanticipated  monetary  shock,  Mt,  but  the 
controls include lagged values of both market and TES rates with similar maturities.  
The definition of monetary shock is crucial to minimize the bias of the estimated 
impulse response functions. If a change in the policy interest rate is anticipated by market 
participants, then it would be incorporated in longer term TES or financial system interest 
rates before it happens. When the change occurs, the reaction of longer interest rates will be 
null, leading to an estimated negligible transmission of monetary policy. Therefore, the 
estimated  monetary  policy  shock  must  be  unanticipated  and,  so,  orthogonal  to  all 
information that might be relevant to predict the policy rate at each point in time. Appendix 
2 provides some details on the estimation of the monetary policy shock that is used in our 
estimations. 
  The results for the transmission of policy rates to TES interest rates are shown in 
Graphs 10 to 13
14. There seems to be two clearly different regimes: one between 2002 and 
2003, the other between 2005 and 2011, and a transition year in 2004. Between 2002 and 
2003 there were negative monetary shocks (Graph 29), meaning that the market expected 
policy rate increases that did not happen. According to Graphs 10 to 13, 0-5 year TES rates 
increased and the zero coupon curve steepened up to the sixth month after the shock. TES 
rates for maturities greater than five years, slightly declined on impact, but rose sharply 
afterwards
15. In contrast, between 2005 and 2011, the monetary shock took both positive 
and negative values and its volatility was substantially smaller (Graph 29). In this period all 
TES rates rose with a positive monetary shock, while the zero coupon curve generally 
flattened afterwards, as can be seen by comparing the impacts across time and maturity. 
  A possible interpretation of these results is that the monetary policy response to the 
risk aversion shock, the COP depreciation and rising core inflation observed between 2002 
and 2003
16 was deemed insufficient by the market, so it was judged as a policy mistake that 
would require a correction over the short term (hence the response of the 0 -3 year bond 
prices) or would risk a future rise of inflation (hence the response of the bonds with 
                                                           
13 The equation for the TES rates controls for the influence of  the Embi Colombia, t  
14 The technique used allows us to estimate the impulse response functions with confidence intervals for each 
month in the sample. The results presented in Graphs 11 to 14 correspond to the average responses for each 
year with the confidence interval calculated as before. We used one lag of TES rates in the estimation. 
15 Given the units of the TES rates and the monetary shock, an impulse response value of 100 corresponds to a 
one-on-one transmission of the monetary shock. 
16  Following a sharp increase in the EMBI the second semester of 2002, the COP depreciated by 23.3% 
between June 2002 and March 2003, while annual CPI without food inflation rose from 5.5% on average in 
the first semester of 2002 to 6.6% on average in the first semester of 2003.   11 
maturity greater than 3 years). Alternatively, there may be omitted variables that account 
for the negative response of the TES rates to the monetary policy shock, even though the 
econometric model controls for the effects of the contemporaneous sovereign risk premium 
shock
17. After 2004 monetary policy shocks are  smaller and the curve seems to shift 
upward and flatten after a positive shock, a plausible sign of greater credibility of monetary 
policy
18. 
  With respect to the transmission of monetary policy shocks to market interest rates, 
there is also evidence of a structural change linked to the average maturity of new issues of 
TES. The main findings in this regard may be summarized as follows: 
 
  For all loan and deposit rates considered there are two regimes: One, between 2002 
and 2003, in which a positive monetary shock produces non-significant or, in few 
cases, negative responses of market rates. The other, between 2005 and 2011, in 
which  there  are  generally  positive,  significant  responses  of  market  rates  to  a 
monetary shock. As in the case of the TES rates responses, 2004 seems to have been 
a transition year (Graphs 10-27). 
  The  response  of  commercial  loan  rates  after  2004  is  monotonically  increasing, 
reaching values that indicate a reaction greater than one-on-one after one year. This 
contrasts with the responses of the TES rates at similar maturities and suggests that 
corporate credit risk premia may rise after a positive monetary shock. 
  The response of consumer loan rates with maturity less than one year after 2004 is 
initially negative, but positive six months after the monetary shock and less than 
one-on-one. For longer maturities, the response is very small for the first five or six 
months after the shock, but increases afterwards, reaching values that indicate a 
reaction greater than one-on-one after one year. 
  Deposit  (CD) interest  rates with  maturities less than one  year increase  with  the 
monetary shock, reaching values that indicate a reaction close to one-on-one. CD 
interest rates with maturity greater than one year show a response larger than one-
on-one after one year. 
The contrast between the responses before and after 2004 may be a sign of rising credibility 
of monetary policy throughout the decade, as in the case of the TES rates responses. The 
lengthening of the maturity of TES could serve as a proxy for this increased credibility. 
However, it is indicative that, unlike the TES rates reaction in 2002-2003, several market 
rates did not display a negative, significant response to the monetary shock in the same 
years.  Thus,  other  phenomena  could  have  influenced  the  estimated  change  in  the 
transmission. 
                                                           
17 In particular, during those years there was a strong disturbance in the TES market after a sovereign risk 
aversion shock because banks cut funding to brokers that had leveraged to invest in these securities. It is 
possible then that, due to fire-sales of TES, their prices fell beyond what could be explained by fundamentals. 
18 This response implies that the monetary surprise is expected to persist and is therefore transmitted to longer 
rates (i.e. is not considered a policy mistake).   12 
 The extension of the maturity of new TES issues and the TES stock may have 
enhanced to role of the public debt market in the determination of financial system interest 
rates, by providing liquid, reliable “risk-free” benchmarks at more maturities than before. 
In  turn,  this  may  have  reinforced  the  transmission  of  monetary  shocks  to  lending  and 
deposit rates. Without reliable “risk-free” benchmarks, interest setters had to produce an 
individual forecast of the future path of short term policy rates in order to determine longer 
term deposit or loan interest rates. Such a forecast could be compared with other agents´ 
forecast only with lags and noise, through the examination of competitors´ interest rates. In 
these circumstances, future policy forecasts may be rather inaccurate and a policy shock 
may be more frequently associated to a forecast error than to a signal of a changing policy 
stance. Hence, transmission could be low. 
 
In  the  presence  of  a  liquid  TES  market,  interest  rate  setters  could  have  an 
immediate, centralized source of information regarding others´ views on future monetary 
policy.  As  a  consequence,  the  forecasts  of  future  policy  rates  may  have  become  more 
precise and a monetary policy shock could be more frequently interpreted as a signal of 
changing policy stance than as a simple forecast error noise. Given that monetary policy 
shifts  have  some  persistence  (they  are  rarely  undone  in  the  short  term),  the  surprise 
involved in the shock is informative of a path of future Central Bank interest rates that is 
likely  to  be  higher  or  lower  than  previously  expected.    Hence,  transmission  could  be 
greater. 
5.  Conclusion 
 In the past decade the Colombian Authorities undertook a series of measures that reduced 
the structural fiscal deficit, corrected a possibly unsustainable public debt path, decreased 
the Government currency mismatch and deepened the local fixed-rate public bond market. 
The evidence shown in this paper suggests that these improvements had profound effects 
on the behavior of the macroeconomy. More specifically, they permanently reduced the 
sovereign risk premium (with the ensuing consequences on the real interest and exchange 
rates), increased the reaction of output to (unexpected) Government expenditure shocks 
(but  still  with  multipliers  lower  than  one)  and  may  have  strengthened  the  response  of 
market interest rates to (unanticipated) monetary policy interest rate shocks. As a corollary, 
an increased soundness of fiscal policy may not only result in permanently lower costs of 
funding for all agents in the economy, but it may also enhance the power of fiscal and 
monetary policy to act counter-cyclically. 
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Graph 1: Central Government Debt to GDP ratio 
 
Graph 2: Currency Mismatch Indicator for Central Government  
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Graph 3: Composition of the Domestic Public Debt 
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Graph 5: Maturity Composition of the fixed-rated TES stock 
 
Table 1: Determination of the EMBI Colombia: Long run relationships 
 
              
 
 
Dependent variable: EMBI Colombia 
     
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
 
 
gra: LVIX  0.6266  0.1700  3.6847  0.0006 
 
 
log(d/y)  0.8529  0.3850  2.2153  0.0321 
 
 
log(cm)  1.2614  0.1669  7.5569  0.0000 
 
 
C  0.4002  1.6093  0.2487  0.8048 
 
 
Cointegration Test Hansen(1992) 
     
 
LM= 0.392339 p-value >0.20 
 
 
              
 
 
Dependent variable: EMBI Colombia 
     
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
 
 
gra: LSPREAD  0.5565  0.1229  4.5281  0.0000 
 
 
log(d/y)  0.5061  0.3247  1.5586  0.1264 
 
 
log(cm)  1.3208  0.1446  9.1328  0.0000 
 
 
C  2.5258  1.2213  2.0681  0.0447 
 
 
Cointegration Test Hansen(1992) 
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Graph 6: Difference between actual and debt-stabilizing primary  
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Graph 7: Fiscal Policy Shock: 
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Graph 8: Fiscal Policy shock: 
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Graph 9: Fiscal Policy Shock: 
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Graph 10:  Monetary policy shock: 
 Response of TES with maturity less than one year conditional on the average maturity of new issues of fixed-rated 
TES 
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Graph 11. Monetary policy shock: 
 Response of TES with maturity between one and three years conditional on the average maturity of new issues of 
fixed-rated TES 
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Graph 12. Monetary policy shock:  
Response of TES with maturity between three and five years conditional on the average maturity of new issues of 
fixed-rated TES 
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Graph 13. Monetary policy shock: 
Response of TES with maturity greater than five years conditional on the average maturity of new issues of fixed-
rated TES 
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Graph 14. Monetary policy shock: 
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Graph 15.  Monetary policy shock: 
Response of Commercial loan rate with maturity between 1 to 3 years conditional on the average maturity of new 
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Graph 16. Monetary policy shock: 
Response of Commercial loan rate with maturity between 3 to 5 years conditional on the average maturity of new 
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Graph 17. Monetary policy shock: 
Response of Commercial loan rate with maturity greater than 5 years conditional on the average maturity of new 
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Graph 18. Monetary policy shock: 
Response of the consumer loan rate with maturity less than 1 year conditional on the average maturity of new issues 
of fixed-rated TES
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Graph 19. Monetary policy shock: 
Response of the consumer loan rate with maturity between 1 and 3 years conditional on the average maturity of new 
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Graph 20. Monetary policy shock: 
Response of the consumer loan rate with maturity between 3 and 5 years conditional on the average maturity of new 
issues of fixed-rated TES
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Graph 21. Monetary policy shock: 
Response of the consumer loan rate with maturity greater than 5 years conditional on the average maturity of new 
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Graph 22. Monetary policy shock: 
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Graph 23. Monetary policy shock: 
Response of the CDT rate with maturity of 90 days conditional on the average maturity of new issues of fixed-rated 
TES
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Graph 24. Monetary policy shock: 
Response of the CDT rate with maturity between 91 and 170 days conditional on the average maturity of new issues 
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Graph 25. Monetary policy shock: 
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Graph 26. Monetary policy shock: 
Response of the CDT rate with maturity between 181 and 360 days conditional on the average maturity of new issues 
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Graph 27. Monetary policy shock: 
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Graph 28. Fiscal shock 
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Appendix 1 
Calculation of the Government Expenditure Shocks 
To construct the spending forecast of the central government we followed these steps:  
a.  The budget execution rate for each quarter in a year was obtained from the 
annual and quarterly historical data of actual expenditures.  
b.  The  annual  spending  announcements  made  by  the  Government  in  the 
beginning of each year in its Financial Plans are considered as the annual 
spending forecast. 
c.  Based  on  (i)  and  (ii)  we  predict  the  Government  spending  for  the  four 
quarters of each year by multiplying the corresponding budget execution rate 
(using  a  moving  average  of  4th-order)  by  the  annual  spending 
announcements.  
d.  By the end of the second quarter, information  on the first quarter actual 
expenditure is available. Thus, we add an adjustment to the forecast of the 
third and fourth quarters that results from the assumptions that the annual 
expenditure plan will be fulfilled and that the first quarter forecast error is 
uniformly distributed between the  second, third and fourth quarters. 
e.  By the end of the third quarter, information on the second quarter actual 
expenditure is available. Thus, we add an adjustment to the forecast of the 
fourth quarter that results from the assumptions that the annual expenditure 
plan will be fulfilled and that the second quarter forecast error is uniformly 
distributed between the third and fourth quarters. 
f.  The series of forecast errors (calculated with respect to the adjusted forecasts 
in the case of the third and fourth quarters) is the expenditure shock for each 
quarter. Graph 28 shows the fiscal shock (measured in 2010 COP billions). 
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Appendix 2 
Estimation of the Monetary Policy Shock 
Similar  to  what  is  usually  done  in  the  VAR  literature,  the  monetary  policy  shock  is 
identified as an unexpected movement of the policy rate.  That is, we suppose that there is a 
policy rule that relates the state of the economy with the actions of the monetary authorities 
and  consequently  a  monetary  policy  shock  will  be  a  movement  in  the  policy  rate  not 
explained by the rule. For example, under the assumption that the central bank follows a 
standard Taylor rule, a movement in the policy rate not explained by the observed behavior 
of inflation and output will be a monetary shock. However, if the central bank follows an 
expectations-based rule, that is a rule in which the expected value of inflation and output 
are important, then it is natural to include within an estimated Taylor rule not just current 
inflation and output but also any other variables that can be useful indicators about the 
future behavior of these variables.  
Notice also that under the VAR recursive identification, a monetary policy shocks is not 
only an unexpected movement of the policy rate but it is also orthogonal to the information 
set of the Central Bank. In other words, it is assumed that a variable that is observed by the 
Central Bank cannot react contemporaneously to the policy shock.  With this is in mind it is 
possible to see that a forecast error can serve as proxy of a policy shock. In fact, we defined 
the policy shock through the forecast error: it+1 – E[it+1|t] where it+1 is the actual policy 
rate at time t+1 and E[it+1|t] is its expected value given the information set at time t 
denoted by t.  
Our definition of the policy shocks is coherent with the definition of the policy shock in a 
VAR model for two reasons: First, it captures unexpected movements in the policy rate and 
second because, by definition, it is orthogonal the information set.  However, given our 
definition of a policy shock, we can capture policy shocks that are policy errors or changes 
in the policy stance not necessarily expected at time t. In the first case, the policy rate is, 
unintentionally,  too  low  or  too  high  with  respect  to  what  is  dictated  by  a  policy  rule, 
whereas  in  the  second  case,  the  policy  shock  signals  a  change  in  the  monetary  policy 
stance. The source of the policy shocks can have very different effects on the economy. 
To  make  operational  this  definition  of  the  policy  shock  one  needs  to  be  particularly 
carefully about the definition of the information set t and the way E[it+1|t] is estimated. 
Empirically the main concern with t is not to include variables that are not observed at 
time t.  In our exercise, the information set contains information on inflation, output, credit, 
the  exchange  rate,  etc.  However,  some  of  these  variables  are  observed  with  delay  and 
consequently its current values cannot be in t.  
We approximate E[it+1|t] with linear projections. That is, E[it+1|t] =  + 1 xt where xt 
is an element of  t. and  are estimated by OLS.  We select the elements in xt by 
minimizing the AIC criterion.  
Finally, to construct a sequence of monetary policy shocks we carried out a rolling exercise 
where we forecast it+1 at time t and compared it with the actual value of it+1. At each t the 
information  set  is  updated  and  the  elements  of  xt  are  selected  by  minimizing  the  AIC   43 
criterion. The initial sample of the rolling experiment is 1999m9-2000m12 and is expanded 
until 2011m12. 
The policy shocks are constructed using monthly data on the interbank rate, the Colombian 
inflation target, the growth rate of the index industrial production, the growth rate of credit, 
the  index  of  capacity  utilization,  the  nominal  average  unit  labor  cost,  the  nominal 
depreciation of the Colombian peso, the Index of Consumer Confidence (ICC) and the US 
inflation rate
19.  The shocks are shown in Graph 29. 
 
                                                           
19 All growth rates are annual, the index of capacity utilization, and the nominal average unitary labor cost are 
included in annual changes. Data is seasonally adjusted using TRAMO-SEATS in Eviews). All these 
variables are in general available with a delay of one month, however the Index of Industrial Production, the 
Unitary Labor cost and the ICC are observed with a delay of two months. 